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Plaintiffs Ivan Radman, Janet Radman, Donna Smylie, Peter Radman, Joanne
Crook, Bronte Clark, Martin Radman, and Jordan Radman (the "Radmans" or
"Appellants") respectfully submit their response/reply brief on appeal.
REPLY ARGUMENT IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS' BRIEF
INTRODUCTION
Appellee's Brief fails to address certain critical legal issues. First, Appellee
avoids the fact that the Merger Agreement was an integrated agreement1 and fails to
acknowledge the trial court's ruling that, with the exception of the Market Protection
provision (more fully discussed herein), the pertinent terms of the Merger Agreement
were unambiguous. Next, Appellee does not substantively address the fact that, in spite
of this determination, the trial court made numerous improper findings premised upon
Appellee's subjective intent in entering into the Merger Agreement (even though no
demonstration of that alleged intent can be found in the Merger Agreement itself).
These critical, foundational rulings, which are reviewable for correctness by the
Court of Appeals, formed the basis for the trial court's reversible award of damages to
Appellee (hereinafter "Flanders" or "Appellee"). If this Court finds that the trial court
erred in its interpretation of the contract by relying upon extrinsic evidence to alter the
character of the transaction or that the trial court employed an incorrect method to
1

As the Radmans explained in their opening brief, the fact that the Merger
Agreement was fully integrated required the trial court to give effect to all of its
terms, including the integration clause. Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752
P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988) ("[I]t is axiomatic that a contract should be interpreted
so as to harmonize all of its provisions and all of its terms, and all of its terms
should be given effect if it is possible to do so."). See also Appellants' Brief, pp.
16-26.

1

calculate damages, this Court need not even reach the issue of whether the actual amount
of damages awarded by the trial court was properly calculated. However, even if this
Court finds that the trial court correctly interpreted the Merger Agreement, the trial
court's award of damages should be reversed because its determination of the value of the
assets, including the electric melters, was clearly erroneous.
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT RELIED UPON EXTRINSIC
EVIDENCE TO INTERPRET AN UNAMBIGUOUS CONTRACT.
A.

An Unambiguous Contract Must Be Interpreted from the Language of the

Contract Itself. The Radmans acknowledge that a court may consider evidence outside
the four corners of a written agreement when making the initial determination as to
whether a written agreement is ambiguous. See Peterson v. Sunrider Corp.. 48 P.3d 918,
925 (Utah 2002) ("In determining whether a contract is ambiguous the court is not bound
to consider only the language of the contract. 'Any relevant evidence must be
considered' so that the court 'can place itself in the same situation the parties found
themselves at the time of contracting."') (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, the
Radmans do not argue, as asserted by Flanders, that the trial court erred when it
considered extrinsic evidence in its efforts to determine whether the parties' written
agreement was ambiguous.2

2

As a result, it is not the introduction of extrinsic evidence for the purpose of
determining whether the contract was ambiguous that the Radmans argue was
error, but rather the trial court's improper reliance upon such evidence to interpret
the written agreement between the parties after it had already determined that the
written agreement was not ambiguous. Accordingly, Flanders' claim that the
Radmans have not properly complied with Rule 24(e) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure is unavailing.

2

However, once the trial court determined that the provisions of the written
agreement were clear and unambiguous, it could not rely on such extrinsic evidence in
interpreting the agreement. Id. ("[I]f after considering such evidence, the court
determines that the language of the contract is not ambiguous, then the parties' intentions
must be determined solely from the language of the contract.") (emphasis added).3 It is
at this point that the trial court erred. The trial court made specific findings and
conclusions that the subject provisions of the Merger Agreement were unambiguous. R.
at 4887 5 5,4889 5 11. 4 Yet, it proceeded to make findings regarding Flanders'
subjective intent in entering into the Merger Agreement and relied upon that subjective
intent in interpreting the Merger Agreement as an asset purchase agreement. Further, the
trial court improperly relied upon extrinsic evidence to interpret and implement specific
provisions of the Merger Agreement, including the warranties at issue.
For example, as discussed in Appellants' Brief, the trial court erroneously
concluded that the Merger Agreement was actually an asset purchase agreement because
it was "clear from the evidence that the machines were the primary interest of Flanders,"
R. at 4293, and that "Flanders' primary purpose in acquiring GFI was to acquire two
See also Tom Heal Commercial Real Estate v. Overton. 116 P.3d 965, 968 n.5
(Utah Ct. App. 2005) ("In interpreting unambiguous contracts, [courts] do not
consider a party's subjective intent, but rather assume its intent is accurately
reflected in the plain meaning of the terms used."); Ford v. Am. Express Fin.
Advisors. Inc.. 98 P.3d 15, 22 (Utah 2004) ("To determine [contracting] parties'
intent, courts look to the parties' manifest intent, not their subjective intent. ).
It should be noted that the trial court did find one specific provision of the Merger
Agreement to be ambiguous (the Market Protection provision that is discussed
more fully herein in response to Flanders' cross-appeal), and it properly
considered extrinsic evidence in order to clarify the ambiguous term within that
provision, demonstrating the proper use of and reliance upon extrinsic evidence.

3

pieces of fiberglass manufacturing equipment known as 'electric melters.'" R. at 4877,5J
13. The trial court committed error when it based its interpretation and construction of
the Merger Agreement upon Flanders' subjective intent—it was required to assume that
the parties' intent was accurately reflected in the plain meaning of the terms used in the
Merger Agreement. See Tom Heal Commercial Real Estate v. Overton. 116 P.3d 965,
968 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 2005). Absolutely nothing in the Merger Agreement lends itself
to the trial court's decision to interpret it as an asset purchase agreement. The Merger
Agreement is not an asset purchase agreement; not in title, description, or effect. Rather,
the Merger Agreement is precisely what it purports to be—a stock-for-stock merger
agreement by which Flanders acquired 100% of the stock of GFI, including its attendant
personnel, customer lists, ongoing filter manufacturing operations, equipment, accounts
receivable, inventory, supplies, materials, office equipment, goodwill, and all other
tangible and intangible assets of GFI. In exchange, the former GFI shareholders received
stock in Flanders.
B.

The Trial Court Erred When It Relied Upon Extrinsic Evidence to Interpret

the Unambiguous Warranties Contained Within the Merger Agreement. In its
Memorandum Decision dated October 6, 2005, the trial court specifically relied upon
extrinsic evidence regarding pre-merger statements the Radmans allegedly made related
to certain equipment performance standards in its explanation of why it had found that
the equipment did not conform to the standard of "good operating condition, ordinary
wear and tear excepted," in spite of having already ruled that the term was unambiguous.
R. at4294,n.3.
4

Furthermore, in its application of this warranty, contained in Paragraph 3(h) of the
Merger Agreement, the trial court never reconciled its reliance upon extrinsic evidence
regarding specific performance standards for the electric melters5 with its determination
that the standard set forth in the warranty, that the equipment be in "good operating
condition, ordinary wear and tear excepted," requires nothing more than that the
equipment "performs the function expected of a similar piece of equipment in the
industry to the standards of the industry, modified to take into account the effects of the
equipment's age and prior wear." R. at 4294.6
Rather than relying on this "industry standard" approach, the trial court premised
its determination that the Radmans had breached the warranty on its conclusion that the
equipment failed to comply with the Radmans' alleged pre-merger statements regarding
performance standards that were neither included in the Merger Agreement, nor shown to
be the industry standard. R. at 4294. Such reliance upon these pre-merger statements is
reversible error.
C.

Extrinsic Evidence Cannot Alter the Warranty in Paragraph 2(h) of the

Merger Agreement. Flanders also argues that the trial court properly considered extrinsic
"[T]hat the electric melters were completed, one man could run two electric
melters, each electric melter could produce 20 pads per day, and the electric
melters could produce fiberglass for 2 to 2-1/2 cents per square foot." R. at 4294,
n.3.
Flanders claims that the trial court may consider whatever evidence it deems
necessary and reasonable to determine whether a breach of a contract has
occurred. However, Flanders misses the crux of the Radmans' argument, which is
that the trial court cannot use extrinsic evidence to establish what the standard for
a breach is when the written agreement itself is unambiguous. For example, here
the trial court was required to interpret the phrase "good operating condition,
ordinary wear and tear excepted" without resorting to alleged pre-merger
statements to establish what that warranty required.

5

evidence regarding the Radmans' alleged pre-merger statements in order to determine
whether the Radmans breached the "No Misrepresentations Warranty" contained in
Paragraph 2(h) of the Merger Agreement. However, that warranty relates solely to the
representations and warranties set forth in the Merger Agreement itself. Specifically, the
"No Misrepresentations Warranty" states as follows:
The G.F.I. Shareholders have not made any material misstatement of
fact or omitted to state any material fact necessary or desirable to make
complete, accurate and not misleading every representation and warranty
set forth herein. R. at 510 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, the trial court was required to first determine what representations
and warranties were set forth in the Merger Agreement. With regard to the warranty that
the equipment be in "good operating condition, ordinary wear and tear excepted," the
trial court made such a determination—one that did not include any representations
concerning specific output, operational or cost figures, or future performance of the
equipment. Accordingly, in determining whether the Radmans made any material
misstatements or omissions, the trial court was required to restrict its analysis to the
warranty that was actually made within the Merger Agreement (i.e., "good operating
condition"), rather than to consider alleged pre-merger statements related to performance
standards that were not included within the written document.7

Of course, if Flanders believed that the Radmans had fraudulently induced them
into the Merger Agreement by making misrepresentations as to the specific
performance standards of the equipment, evidence of those statements could
certainly be relied upon by the trial court when determining whether the Radmans
had committed fraud or misrepresentation. However, Flanders dismissed its fraud
and misrepresentation claims with prejudice prior to trial.

6

D.

Conclusion. The trial court's interpretation of the Merger Agreement was

incorrect as a matter of law because it relied upon the subjective intent of Flanders rather
than the language of the document itself and because it improperly recharacterized the
parties' agreement as an asset purchase agreement when the clear language of the
agreement provided it was a stock-for-stock merger. The trial court further erred when it
imported specific performance standards that did not exist in the written agreement and
used such performance standards as the basis for determining that a breach of warranty
had occurred. Accordingly, the trial court's ruling in favor of Flanders on the issue of
breach of warranty should be reversed.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF DAMAGES TO FLANDERS WAS
REVERSIBLE ERROR.
The trial court's error in characterizing the Merger Agreement as an asset purchase

agreement, as well as its reliance upon performance standards that are not found within
the Merger Agreement, initiated a snowball effect. First, the trial court determined that
its methodology for determining damages should focus on the individual assets of GFI,
rather than its stock. Next, the trial court improperly relied upon Flanders' subjective
intent in acquiring GFI, which was also not expressed in the Merger Agreement, to assign
value to those individual assets. At the end of its analysis, after finding that Flanders had
failed to prove its repair costs or lost profits, the trial court granted what appears to be a

7

rescission (the return of everything the trial court determined Flanders paid for the
electric melters), without requiring that Flanders tender a return of the equipment.8
Finally, even if this Court affirms the trial court's characterization of the Merger
Agreement as an asset purchase agreement, its reliance upon Flanders' subjective intent
in acquiring the GFI stock, and its decision to allow the demonstration of damages
without any evidence as to the impact of the alleged breach of warranties on the value of
the GFI stock, the trial court's factual findings regarding the value of the electric melters
were clearly erroneous and should be reversed.9
A.

The Trial Court Utilized an Improper Method for Determining Damages.

The trial court's characterization of the Merger Agreement as an asset purchase
agreement led to an award of damages to Flanders when absolutely no evidence
regarding the value of the GFI stock (the true subject of the parties' transaction) was
introduced at trial.
Flanders clearly made a strategic decision at trial to not present any evidence
regarding the impact of the alleged breach of warranties on the value of the GFI stock and
focused instead upon its claims for repair costs and lost profits. However, Flanders must
now bear the consequences of that choice, which left the trial court with no supportable
basis for calculating an award of damages. Flanders cites Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d
143, 150 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) for the premise that "[T]he measure of damages for breach
8

Each of these rulings is reviewed for correctness, which does not require the
Radmans to marshal evidence, as Flanders claims.

9

With regard to this issue, the Radmans have properly marshaled the evidence, as
discussed further herein.

8

of a warranty . . . is the excess of the value the asset would have had if it had been as
warranted over the actual value of the asset." See Appellee's Brief, p. 21-22. This is
simply an incorrect statement of Brown's holding. Brown did not award the measure of
damages described by Flanders for a breach of warranty. Instead, the Utah Court of
Appeals found that a jury award on a breach of warranty cause of action could be
supported by evidence that the purchaser incurred costs in repairing one of the assets he
received as part of his purchase of the business.10 In this matter, the trial court correctly
determined that Flanders failed to present sufficient evidence upon which the court could
determine its repair costs. However, the trial court committed reversible error when it
chose an improper methodology for conducting its damages analysis. Instead, the trial
court should have ruled, as a matter of law, that the absence of evidence about how the
alleged breach of warranty affected the value of the GFI stock acquired by Flanders,
coupled with the insufficiency of the evidence as to repair costs, resulted in Flanders'
failure to meet its burden to prove that it was actually damaged by the alleged breach.
B.

The Trial Court Erred in Relying Upon Flanders' Subjective Intent When

Assigning Value to the Assets. In determining the value to assign to the individual
assets Flanders received as a result of the transaction, the trial court erred further when it
relied upon Flanders' subjective intent.
10

In Brown, the purchaser was also awarded "benefit of the bargain" damages,
calculated by comparing the value of the entire company as it was represented to
its value as it actually was, in response to his fraud and misrepresentation claims.
See Brown v. Richards. 840 P.2d 143 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Here, Flanders
dismissed its fraud and misrepresentation claims with prejudice. In addition,
Flanders failed to present any evidence with regard to the value of GFI's stock,
whereas in Brown there was testimony with regard to the value of the business as
a whole.

9

Ultimately, the trial court's conclusion that the "value" of the electric melters at
the time of the merger had they been as warranted was $1,163,528 was based on the
improper legal premise that the trial court should determine the value of the equipment to
Flanders rather than require evidence of an objective valuation of the electric melters.
The trial court relied on Flanders' subjective intent when characterizing the Merger
Agreement as an asset purchase agreement, and then further relied on it when
determining that the purchase price, after deductions for inventory and accounts
receivable, should be allocated solely to the electric melters.11 Because the trial court's
allocation of value was based upon an erroneous legal premise, the trial court's
determination that the value of the electric melters at the time of the merger was
$1,163,528 was incorrect as a matter of law. Therefore, the trial court's award of
damages to Flanders should be reversed.
C.

The Radmans Have Properly Marshaled the Evidence. The Radmans have

sufficiently marshaled the evidence and demonstrated that such evidence, even when
viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, is legally insufficient.
Flanders expends significant effort in its opposition brief attempting to demonstrate that
the Radmans have not met their burden to marshal the evidence. However, its attempts
11

Flanders' claim that the trial court properly looked to the substance of the
transaction rather than its form is unavailing. The cases cited by Flanders in
support of this argument address issues of equity, rather than damages. In addition,
in claiming that the trial court applied a "commonsense approach" in determining
that "the best evidence of the value of the electric melters was the value placed on
them by the parties themselves," Appellee's Brief, p. 24, Flanders again points to
its own subjective intent. The only evidence as to the value ascribed to the electric
melters by the Radmans was that Ivan Radman estimated their value at $130,000.
Appellants' Brief, p.38; Add. 5.

10

are both misleading and inaccurate. First, what Flanders describes as a "paltry" list of
facts actually encompasses over one hundred and forty pages of testimony and
documents, which the Radmans not only marshaled, but included in the Addendum to
their appellate brief. In addition, many of the facts that Flanders claims the Radmans
failed to list are actually included in the Radmans' summary of the marshaled evidence.
Finally, some of the "facts" listed by Flanders are not accurate representations of the trial
testimony.
Flanders provides a list of facts on pages 25-28 of its brief that it claims the
Radmans should have included in order to fulfill their marshaling requirements. The
Radmans address each of those items below in the same numerical order as presented in
Flanders' brief:12
1.

Age of Equipment. See Appellee's Brief, p. 25,5 1. The age of the

melters, as well as all other equipment, was mentioned in Appellants' Brief, along with
citations to the record. See Appellants' Brief, pp. 22-23, n.15.
2.

Electric Melters Were Subject of Parties' Pre-Merger Discussions. See

Appellee's Brief, p. 26,5 2. This evidence does not relate to the value of the melters, but
rather to the interpretation of the parties' unambiguous written agreement. Interpretation
of an unambiguous written agreement is a question of law, and the marshaling
requirement applies only to challenges of factual findings, not conclusions of law. See
Peirce v. Peirce. 994 P.2d 193, 198 n.4 (Utah 2000).
12

The headings provided herein are the Radmans' attempt to summarize the content
of the paragraph referenced and are not intended to indicate any agreement with
Flanders' characterization of the evidence.

11

3.

Ivan Radman's Opinion of the Gas Melters. See Appellee's Brief, p. 26,5

3. Although it is true that Ivan Radman considered the gas melters to be dirty and
difficult to work with (an opinion which has no bearing on their value), the statement that
the Radmans' primary purpose in running GFI was to build the electric melters is not
supported by Flanders' cite to the record.13 See R. 4942 pp. 48-49, in which there is
nothing remotely resembling this statement.14 In reality, the assets of GFI were
purchased in 1990, and GFI began operating a fiberglass manufacturing plant at that time.
R. at 4859,55 1-2, 4874,55 1-2. Development of the electric melters did not begin until
approximately four years later, in 1994. R. at 4860,5 9, 4946, pp. 440-42.
Furthermore, the claim that the Radmans told their employees to make the electric
melters look artificially efficient (a fact the Radmans vehemently deny), even if true,
does not speak to the value that the trial court might now allocate to the melters.
4.

Alleged Representations Regarding Performance of Electric Melters. See

Appellee's Brief, p. 26,5 4. The citations to the record set forth in this paragraph relate
to the trial court's interpretation of an integrated, unambiguous written agreement, rather
than the valuation of a particular asset. The interpretation of an unambiguous agreement

The Radmans acknowledge that the trial court adopted a factual finding, supplied
by Flanders, that the Radmans' primary purpose in operating GFI was the
development of the electric melters. The Radmans timely objected to this finding
(R. at 4612-13) and note that this finding was not contained in the trial court's
memorandum decision; nor is it supported by the evidence.
Ivan Radman's testimony could not have been referring to forming GFI, because it
has been established that GFI had been in existence since 1990. Rather, Mr.
Radman was likely referring to WF Engineering, a separate company from GFI.

12

is a question of law, not a question of fact to which a marshaling requirement applies.
Peirce v. Peirce. 994 P.2d 193, 198, n.4 (Utah 2000).
5.

The Radmans' Alleged Efforts to Sell GFI. See Appellee's Brief, p. 27,J

5. The "facts" stated in this paragraph are not supported by the record. Flanders claims
that the Radmans had made affirmative efforts to sell GFI to multiple companies prior to
the transaction with Flanders, but the record actually reflects that one company
approached GFI, rather than the reverse, to inquire about purchasing GFI, and that GFI
had discussions with a second company, although the record is unclear as to whether GFI
or the second company initiated those discussions. R. 4942, pp. 54-55.
In addition, with regard to Flanders' second statement that "the evidence suggests
that Ivan Radman told his employees that he was going to shut down GFI," Flanders' first
cite to the record actually indicates just the opposite. See R. 4942, p. 55, where Ivan
Radman testified that there was gossip going around, but that there was "nothing, in my
mind, to put 20 people down the street when the thing was doing fine." Further, even the
testimony of Darrel Cossey referred to by Flanders does not support the statement that
Ivan Radman told his employees he was going to shut down GFI (as though the decision
had already been made). Instead, Mr. Cossey testified only that Ivan Radman had once
told him that "If we don't make it, we'll shut it down." R. 4943, p. 454 (emphasis added).
The Radmans are not required to marshal evidence that does not exist.
6.

Condition (and Age) of the Equipment. See Appellee's Brief, p. 27, y 6.

As mentioned above, the age of the equipment and the fact that it had been operating for
years was mentioned in Appellants' Brief. Further, the cite to the record for the
13

testimony of James Mercer was included in the list of marshaled evidence in Appellants'
Brief, and attached as an addendum thereto, although the Radmans disagree with
Flanders' characterization of such testimony. See Appellants' Brief, p.34,5 7 and Add.
7. The only other citation to the record included by Flanders in this paragraph relates to
the trial court's consideration of James Mercer's knowledge and experience, which is not
relevant to the value of the equipment.
7.

Consideration Paid for GFI's Stock. See Appellee's Brief, p. 27,5 7. The

Radmans agree that the Stock Merger Agreement values the transaction at $1,500,016.
However, as discussed in Appellants' Brief, the transaction was not an asset purchase
agreement wherein the individual assets were allocated specific portions of the ultimate
purchase price. Rather, the Stock Merger Agreement was precisely what it purported to
be—a stock-for-stock merger. Therefore, the value assigned to the transaction related
only to the shares of stock that were transferred, and was not allocated on an individual
asset-by-asset basis. A conclusion as to the method of calculating damages to be
awarded is a question of law, not a question of fact that requires marshaling.
8.

GFI's Tax Returns. See Appellee's Brief, p. 27,5 8. As with other

evidence that Flanders claims the Radmans have failed to marshal, the Radmans not only
referred to GFI's income tax returns, but also included them in the Addendum to their
Opening Brief. See Appellant's Brief, Add. I. 15
15

Flanders' list of evidence on pages 30 and 31 of its opposition brief, which
Flanders claims the Radmans should have marshaled related to the trial court's
finding that the electric melters had zero value, suffers from many of the same
difficulties described above. See, for example, p. 31, 5 6, wherein Flanders
indicates that the Radmans should have marshaled the "fact" that "Flanders spent
14

Flanders exerts the majority of its efforts in an attempt to demonstrate that the
Radmans have failed to properly marshal the evidence and does little to controvert the
extensive evidence that demonstrates that GFI had significant value aside from the
electric melters, inventory, and accounts receivable. For example, Flanders does not
address the fact that GFI had a profitable filter manufacturing operation, Appellants'
Brief, p. 35; that Flanders continued to operate GFI as an ongoing business, Id, p. 36;
that Flanders' own witnesses testified that Flanders received equipment other than the
electric melters that had nearly $200,000 of value, Id, p. 36-37; that Flanders itself
valued the goodwill of GFI at $547,000, Id, p. 37; and that Flanders continued to
represent this value in its public SEC filings until 2002, five years after the merger, Id, p.
38.
D.

Flanders Failed to Prove its Damages at Trial. At trial, Flanders failed to

prove its damages because it chose not to present evidence regarding the value of GFI's
stock. Moreover, the trial court correctly noted that Flanders did not sufficiently
demonstrate the amount it spent on repairs of the electric melters, or the extent of its
alleged lost profits while such repairs were being made.

at least $1,377,304.19 in projects designed to repair the electric melters."
However, the trial court specifically rejected this evidence, stating that "[w]hile
Flanders argues they spent significant amounts in attempting to 'repair' the
melters, the Court finds the vast majority of money was spent on efforts directed at
modification and redesign" and it "would require complete speculation to break
out the amounts that are truly repairs from those for modification." R. at 4295. It
seems highly illogical to insist that the Radmans marshal evidence as support for
the trial court's decision when the trial court itself explicitly rejected such
evidence.
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In spite of the fact that this was a stock-for-stock merger transaction, the record is
clear that Flanders presented absolutely no evidence at trial with regard to the impact of
the alleged breaches of the warranty on the value of the stock it received. In addition, the
trial court found that it would be "complete speculation" to try to break out from the
figures Flanders did present at trial the amounts spent on repairing the melters. R. at
4295. The trial court also determined that it would be "even more convoluted" to make a
determination regarding Flanders' potential lost profits. Id. To summarize, Flanders
presented no clear evidence under any appropriate measure of damages from which the
trial court could have made a determination of damages based upon a proper
interpretation of the contract.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO AWARD THE
RADMANS PREJUDGMENT INTEREST PRIOR TO SETOFF
The trial court erred in failing to calculate prejudgment interest on the Radmans'

award prior to offsetting Flanders' award. Flanders is correct in noting that Utah courts
have not specifically addressed the issue of whether an unliquidated counterclaim should
be offset before prejudgment interest is awarded on a liquidated claim. As a result of this
lack of directly applicable case law, the Radmans have applied the principles discussed
by the Utah Court of Appeals in Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143 (Utah Ct. App. 1992),
to the facts of the instant case. Appellants' Brief, p. 43.
Courts throughout the nation have utilized several variations of these same
principles in cases where both parties obtain damages awards after the defendant makes
an unliquidated counterclaim against plaintiffs making a liquidated claim. Generally,

16

whether the calcuation of prejudgment interest occurs pre- or post-setoff depends on
whether the claim and counterclaim are related.16 If the claims are related, prejudgment
interest will not be calculated on the amount of the award, but will be calculated on the
balance remaining due after the claims have been setoff. If, however, the claims are
unrelated, prejudgment interest will be calculated on the entire amount of the damages
awarded the plaintiff on its liquidated claim before set off occurs.
The difficulty in applying this rule lies in determining whether the claims are
related; however, most courts have found that the concept of "relatedness" as to claims
should be narrowly construed. Courts have found that related claims almost always
involve one party's claim for payment and another party's claim regarding a reason for
withholding payment. See, e.g.. United States ex rel. Roper v. Reisz. 718 F.2d 1004,
1008 (11th Cir. 1983); Hansen v. CovelL 24 P.2d 772,776-77 (Cal. 1933); Mall Tool Co.
v. Far W. Equip. Co.. 273 P.2d 652, 663 (Wash. 1954). When the claim and
counterclaim both relate to the payment or reason for nonpayment for goods or services
under the same contract, the claims are considered related.
Outside of the very specific and limited circumstances described above, courts
generally find that the claims are unrelated, even when they arise under the same
contract. Claims are unrelated when the counterclaim is not directed at or related to the
plaintiff's liquidated demand. Socony Mobil Oil Co. v. Klapal. 205 F. Supp. 388, 393
(D. Neb. 1962). The Washington Supreme Court applied this principle and found that
!6

Local Okla. Bank v. United States. 59 Fed. CI. 713, 722 (Fed. CI. 2004); see also
Mall Tool Co. v. Far W. Equip. Co.. 273 P.2d 652 (Wash. 1954); Soconv Mobil
Oil Co. v. Klapal. 205 F. Supp. 388 (D. Neb. 1962).
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although both parties' claims arose out of the same contract, the claims concerned
separate or bilateral features of that contract and were unrelated because there was no
direct relationship between the claims. Mall Tool Co. v. Far W. Equip. Co., 273 P.2d
652, 664 (Wash. 1954) (emphasis added). Other courts have held that when an
unliquidated counterclaim is not demandable at the time the original liquidated claim
became due, the claims are unrelated. See Hansen v. Covell. 24 P.2d 772, 776 (Cal.
1933); Soconv Mobil Oil Co. v. KlapaL 205 F. Supp. 388, 393 (D. Neb. 1962). In
applying this principle, the Idaho Court of Appeals found that claims arising from the
same contract—one for breach of the notice provision and another for the nonpayment of
goods that were the subject of the contract—were not related because the counterclaim
was not demandable at the time the liquidated claim became due. Pocatello Auto Color.
Inc. v. Akzo Coatings. Inc.. No. 20349, 1994 Ida. App. LEXIS 76, at *33-34 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1994).
Given the rules stated above, the claims in this case are not related. The Radmans'
claim concerns the adequacy of the payment they received in exchange for GFI stock,
while Flanders' claims concern the warranty regarding the working condition of a GFI
asset that was incidentally acquired as a result of Flanders' acquisition of GFI's stock.
Even though these claims arose out of the same contract, the claims arose from separate
and bilateral provisions of that contract—the Radmans' claim is based on the Market
Protection clause, while Flanders' claims are based on certain warranty provisions.
Additionally, Flanders' counterclaims were not demandable at the time the Radmans'
liquidated claim became due. The facts that gave rise to the Radmans' claim occurred on
18

the date Flanders refused to issue a number of shares of Flanders Common Stock
sufficient to maintain the Market Price of $1.5 million. Flanders' counterclaims were not
demandable at that time because Flanders was still using the electric melters acquired as a
result of its acquisition of GFI's stock to manufacture fiberglass and still using the
electric melter technology to enhance and develop new electric melters. There is no
evidence in the record that Flanders ever attempted to assert a warranty claim until after
the Radmans filed their action against Flanders to enforce the Market Protection
provision of the Merger Agreement.
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's ruling that the Radmans were not
entitled to prejudgment interest prior to setoff should be reversed.
OPPOSITION TO CROSS-APPEAL
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE MARKET
PROTECTION PROVISION OF THE MERGER AGREEMENT WAS
AMBIGUOUS.
While it is true that a determination of whether a contract is ambiguous is a

question of law that is reviewed de novo, a trial court's findings of fact regarding the
intent of the parties after determining that the contract is ambiguous are reviewed under a
clearly erroneous standard. Peterson v. Sunrider Corp.. 48 P.3d 918, 924 (Utah 2002).
In its cross-appeal, Flanders takes issue with the trial court's factual findings regarding
the parties' intent, which were arrived at after determining that the contract's Market
Protection provision was ambiguous, and properly based upon consideration of the
extrinsic evidence. Although Flanders has cited the case of Wade v. Stangl for the
proposition that a de novo review should apply to the trial court's decision in this matter,
19

Wade v. Stangl makes clear that a trial court's construction of an ambiguous contract that
is based on extrinsic evidence is reviewed under the "more deferential clearly-erroneous
standard." 869 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Therefore, the correct standard of
review is de novo with respect to whether the contract provision is ambiguous, and
clearly erroneous with regard to the trial court's findings once it had determined the
contract provision was ambiguous.17
A.

The Market Protection Provision Is Ambiguous. A contract is ambiguous if

"it is unclear, it omits terms, or 'the terms used to express the intention of the parties may
be understood to have two or more plausible meanings.'" Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch..
133 P.3d 428, 432 (Utah 2006) (emphasis added). Here, the Market Protection provision
is unclear. It is also open to two or more plausible meanings.18 The language of the
Market Protection provision reads as follows:
Pursuant to this Agreement, the G.F.I. Shareholders are receiving
187,502 shares of Flanders Capital Stock as set forth on Exhibit "A"
attached hereto. Since the 187,502 shares of Flanders Capital Stock are
restricted shares, each share has a discounted market value of $8.00 per
share, for an aggregate market price of $1,500,016 (the "Market Price"). If
at the time any of the G.F.I. Shareholders sell any of the 187,502 shares of
Flanders Capital Stock at a price below $8.00 per share, and the average
17

Ironically, while Flanders claimed repeatedly in its opposition to the Radmans'
appellate brief that the Radmans failed to meet their burden of marshaling the
evidence, Flanders makes no attempt to marshal the facts with regard to its
argument that the trial court reached an erroneous interpretation of the Merger
Agreement. Because Flanders failed to marshal the evidence relevant to the trial
court's factual findings, this Court should assume that the record supports the
factual findings of the trial court with respect to the parties' intent regarding the
"Market Protection" provision. Wade v. Stangl. 869 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah Ct. App.
1994).

18

In the alternative, even if the Market Protection provision were subject to only one
plausible interpretation, it is the interpretation set forth by the Radmans that is the
most logical, plausible interpretation, as discussed herein.
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trading price for the preceding three business days of Flanders Capital
Stock as listed on the NASDAQ Stock Exchange is below $8.00 per share,
Flanders shall deliver additional restricted shares of Flanders Common
Stock to such G.F.I. Shareholders in order to maintain the Market Price (the
"Short Fall"), with such Short Fall shares valued at the Market Price.
R. at 528.
A reading of this provision simply does not lend itself to a clear, definitive answer
as to what the parties intended, particularly as to the question of how to value the Short
Fall shares. The defined term "Market Price" occurs earlier in the paragraph after a
sentence that includes two different prices—that of the individual shares of Flanders
Capital Stock ($8.00), and that of the "aggregate market price" of $1,500,016.
Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined that the final clause of the Market
Protection provision was unclear.19 On this basis alone, the trial court's ruling that the
Market Protection provision was ambiguous should be affirmed.
B.

Flanders' Interpretation Is Not a Plausible Reading of the Market Protection

Provision. Although Flanders goes to great lengths in its opposition brief to demonstrate
that the "Market Price" referred to in the last line of the Market Protection provision must
be $8.00, this interpretation is not logical. For example, as the trial court properly noted,
once the term "Market Price" was defined following the amount of $1,500,016, that
figure was no longer used in that paragraph, although the term "Market Price" was used
thereafter. On the other hand, even after the term "Market Price" was defined, the term
19

Flanders includes a footnote in its opposition brief in which it claims that a
stipulation between the parties that the Merger Agreement speaks for itself
constitutes a finding that the contract is not ambiguous. See Appellee's Brief, p.
40, n.4. However, each of the cases Flanders cites for this premise is over 100
years old and, more importantly, not one actually makes such a ruling.
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"$8.00 per share" was used twice more. This supports the trial court's conclusion that
"Market Price" did not mean $8.00, as argued by Flanders.
Under Flanders' interpretation, Flanders would have this Court believe that the
Radmans were willing to transfer 100% of their stock with absolutely no guarantee as to
the amount of consideration they would eventually receive. By way of illustration, if the
trading price of a share of Flanders Capital Stock had fallen to $.02 by the time the shares
received by the Radmans were no longer restricted, and all of the 187,502 shares were
sold at that price (for total net sales proceeds of $3,750.04), Flanders' interpretation of
the Market Protection provision would allow them to issue 187,033 additional shares
(($l,500,016-$3,750.04) / $8.00), which would actually only be worth another $3,740.66
when sold at the $.02 trading price. In other words, under Flanders' interpretation and
this scenario, the Radmans would receive a grand total of $7,491.10 in consideration for
their stock, essentially rendering the Market Protection provision meaningless.
Of course, had the Radmans been free to dispose of the shares of Flanders Capital
Stock when they were issued and chose not to do so, the point would be moot—they
would bear the consequences of their own decision. The Market Protection provision
was necessary specifically because the Radmans could not sell their shares for a given
period of time, and the Radmans were unwilling to bear the risk that the compensation
they had negotiated in exchange for their shares of G.F.I, would be non-existent when
they were actually able to sell their Flanders shares.20
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Flanders correctly notes that the additional shares the Radmans were to receive
were also restricted. However, this fact does not negate the purpose of the Market
22

C.

The Radmans' Interpretation of the Market Protection Provision Is

Plausible. Although the lack of clarity of the language itself is a sufficient basis for
upholding the trial court's ruling that the Market Protection provision was ambiguous, the
trial court's ruling is also supported by the fact that the Radmans' interpretation of the
Market Protection provision is not only plausible, it most closely reflects the language of
the Merger Agreement itself and the intention of the parties. Specifically, the defined
term "Market Price" is identified immediately following the phrase "for an aggregate
market price of $1,500,016." The most logical interpretation of the Market Protection
provision is that the parties had agreed to a purchase price for the stock ($1,500,016), but
because the purchase price was to be paid in restricted shares that could not be sold for at
least one year, the Market Protection provision was included in the Merger Agreement to
ensure that the total consideration paid to the Radmans would be protected through the
issuance of additional shares of Flanders Common Stock in the event that the value of
Flanders Capital Stock were to decline before the Radmans could sell the stock.
D.

Conclusion. Flanders did not marshal the evidence that supports the trial

court's factual determinations of what the parties intended to accomplish with the Market
Protection provision. Therefore, this Court should decline to address their argument that
the trial court's findings on that issue were incorrect. Even if the Court were to consider
the issue, the trial court was correct in ruling that the Market Protection provision was
Protection provision. The Radmans were aware that there would be some risk
regarding the ultimate consideration they would receive—the Market Protection
provision, however, was intended to ensure that the Radmans had at least one
opportunity to protect themselves against an unexpected drop in the trading price
or Flanders Capital Stock.
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ambiguous. The trial court also correctly determined that the Market Protection provision
was intended by the parties to require that Flanders issue a sufficient number of
additional shares at the then current trading price to ensure the Radmans received
$1,500,016 (the "Market Price") as consideration in exchange for their shares of GFI
stock.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES TO THE
RADMANS WAS APPROPRIATE,
A trial court's determination both as to who was the prevailing party and the

determination of attorney fees to be awarded are reviewed based upon an abuse of
discretion standard. Cache County v. Beus. 128 P.3d 63, 67 (Utah Ct. App. 2005). Here,
the trial court clearly exercised its discretion in deciding to award fees to the Radmans
based upon their 100% victory on their affirmative claim and their defeat of nearly all of
Flanders' claims for damages.21
Flanders appears to rely almost entirely upon the net judgment rule in its argument
that the trial court incorrectly awarded fees to the Radmans. However, the Utah Supreme
Court has expressly stated that the net judgment rule is not the sole method a court should
use when determining whether to award attorney fees.22 See J. Pochynok Co.. Inc. v.
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The Radmans have not challenged the award of attorney fees to Flanders in this
appeal, but respectfully submit that such an award must be overturned if this Court
rules in favor of the Radmans on appeal. The award of attorney fees to Flanders
may not stand if this Court finds that the trial court erred in its determination that
the Radmans breached the agreement between the parties and its subsequent award
of damages to Flanders. In addition, if the trial court's ruling in favor of Flanders
is overturned, the Radmans should be awarded their fees incurred in defending
against Flanders' claims, both at trial and on appeal.
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Flanders cites the case of Cache County v. Beus. 128 P.3d 63 (Utah Ct. App.
2005) in support of this premise. However, the Utah Court of Appeals has
24

Smedsrud. 116 P.3d 353, 356 (Utah 2005) ("'[R]igid application of the net judgment rule
can result in unreasonable awards of attorney fees' which 'would deprive trial courts of
their power to apply their discretion and common sense to this issue.'") (internal citation
omitted).
A.

An Award of Attorney Fees Is Properly Made Using a Flexible. Reasoned

Approach. The Utah Supreme Court has made clear that, absent an abuse of discretion,
the award of attorney fees is properly left to the trial court. Specifically, the Utah
Supreme Court has stated that the flexible and reasoned approach, "requires . . . looking
at the amounts actually sought and then balancing them proportionally with what was
recovered." J. Pochynok Co.. 116 P.3d at 356-57 (quoting A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing
& Heating v. Guv. 94 P.3d 270, 277 (Utah 2004)).
Although Flanders purports to conduct an application of the flexible and reasoned
approach, Flanders does not include any discussion of this required analysis. The
Radmans filed the underlying action in order to recover $547,904.50 in consideration
pursuant to the Merger Agreement. The judgment entered with regard to the Radmans'
claim was precisely that amount, resulting in a 100% recovery. On the other hand, at
trial, Flanders' claims totaled approximately $107,000,000, R. at 4949, p. 38, of which it

specifically ruled, based upon Utah Supreme Court precedent, that the trial court
must be given the flexibility to perform a case-by-case analysis to handle
circumstances "where both, or neither, parties" may be considered to have
prevailed. Carlson Distrib. Co. v. Salt Lake Brewing Co.. 95 P.3d 1171, 1180
(Utah Ct. App. 2004) (citing R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook. 40 P.3d 1119, 1127 (Utah
2002) (emphasis added)). Accordingly, Cache County cannot be read to disregard
or overrule this precedent.
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received slightly over $1,000,000. In other words, the Radmans recovered 100% of their
claim, while Flanders recovered approximately 1%.
Another approach that has been approved by the Utah Supreme Court, see JL
Pochynok Co., 116 P.3d at 356, could be described as a "comparative victory" approach.
This approach also leads to a conclusion that the Radmans were entitled to recover their
attorney fees. Under such an approach, the court examines what a total victory would
have meant for each party and what a true draw would look like.23 Total victory for
Flanders in the underlying matter would have been approximately $107,000,000.00 (i.e.,
an award of all of the damages it claimed, plus a successful defeat of the Radmans'
claim). Total victory for the Radmans would have been $547,904.50 (i.e., an award of
all of the damages they claimed, plus a successful defeat of Flanders' claims). Under this
approach, Flanders is over $100 Million away from total victory, whereas the Radmans
are approximately $1 Million away from total victory. This analysis further supports the
trial court's award of fees to the Radmans.
Finally, the trial court referred to the unique procedural posture of the underlying
case, which involved completely separate trials on the Radmans' claims and Flanders'
claims, separated by several months, as further support for its determination that both
parties prevailed. R. at 4677. Flanders has not demonstrated that the trial court's award
was an abuse of discretion.
23

Total victory would result from a party not only winning on all of its affirmative
claims, but successfully defending against all counterclaims. For example, the
Radmans won 100% of its affirmative claims, and successfully defended against
all but approximately $1 Million of Flanders' counterclaims.
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B.

Conclusion. Flanders has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its

discretion in awarding fees to the Radmans for their successful claim against Flanders. In
addition, an application of the flexible and reasoned approach demonstrates that the trial
court's award of fees to the Radmans is proper. Accordingly, the trial court's award of
attorney fees to the Radmans should be affirmed.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
For the reasons set forth herein, the Radmans respectfully request that this Court
grant the relief requested in Appellant's Brief. The Radmans further request that this
Court deny Flanders' cross-appeal and affirm the trial court's award of damages and
attorney fees to the Radmans. Finally, the Radmans request an award for the attorney
fees and costs they have incurred on appeal.
DATED this b

day of April, 2007.
CHAPMAN AND CUTLER LLP
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